Weak demand equals rising rates – really?

Feb 14, 2012, 10:23PM EST
In the parallel universe occupied by container shipping lines, the steep rate hikes are unrealistic and a desperate attempt to raise profitability before signing annual contracts.

Can you imagine being the CFO responsible for presenting a container shipping line’s annual results? Standing before the Board you mumble something about the “cyclical nature of the industry” and then attempt to explain how you managed to turn a $500 million profit one year into a $500 million loss the next.

The problem, of course, is that everything associated with the container shipping business is volatile. Freight rates fluctuate wildly, the oil price goes up more often than it comes down, a shortage of skilled seafarers pushes salaries up and capacity regularly outstrips demand. Not to mention having billions of dollars of assets amortising away. It all makes accurate forecasting almost impossible.

How on Earth do you run a business effectively under those conditions? Obviously you don’t because you can’t.

As annual contract negotiations approach on the transpacific, the carriers are determined to improve their profitability and lock customers in for the next 12 months at higher rate levels. Good luck with that.

Asia-North Europe and the Med were the first major routes to be whacked with hefty rate increases but Transpacific Stabilisation Agreement carriers have also jumped on the bandwagon, seeking to raise rates by 40 percent. The TSA wants to hike rates by $300 per FEU on March 15, followed by $500 per FEU to the West Coast and US$700 an FEU to the East Coast a couple of months later.

That will be on top of the current rate of $1,800 per 40ft box from Shanghai to the West Coast.

TSA boss Brian Conrad warns that if the lines achieved only marginal increases in rates they would be setting themselves up for losses for the next 18 months.

The thing is, the TSA does this dance every year before contract negotiations begin with shippers. It is a familiar approach by the carriers that is treated by their customers with great circumspection. And carriers are in a weak position, undermined by excess capacity and rock bottom rates.

Sure, those freight rates are unsustainable at the current levels and shippers understand that they need to be raised. But with the US economy stuttering along with very little growth, how can the lines justify increases of such magnitude? The mood was summed up in a text message we received earlier this week from an incredulous shipper: “GRIs WTF!”

Cargo forecasts for the transpacific aren’t expected to break any records this year, but with inventory levels low after the holidays and good post-Christmas sales, shippers believe there may be a surge around mid-year.

It is probably too much for the carriers to expect a profitable 2012. But in the back of every CFO’s mind as he winces before the barracking Board members is the knowledge that his line has the ability to make a billion dollar turnaround before his next results presentation is due.

 

 
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Comments
Cherry Wang
Hi Greg,

The only reason that would explain rising rates despite weak underlying market fundamentals is irrationality and illogicalness.

When the carriers started placing orders for ultra large vessels in 2007 expecting they would see the 10% growth levels seen in the past decade for the next few years, they faced some severe headwinds when the global economy started to slow down in the midst of a global financial crisis. Ship deliveries were delayed, some mothballed, credit had tightened. Despite the container industry losing $19bn in 2009, carriers went on to place more orders for even larger vessels in 2011, with Maersk setting the trend again with their E-Class 18,000 TEU sized giants. One would think that Mr. Kolding, who was the CFO of AP Moller-Maersk from 1998 – 2006, would have some hindsight from the lessons learnt in 2009, but instead went to place an order for 20 vessels valued at $190m each. That’s a cost of $3.8bn. Then other carriers followed suit. Sure these vessels might be more efficient, but only if they’re filled. Sure the fuel cost per TEU will be lower, but it’s still burning more fuel than a 10,000 TEU vessel. So it doesn’t come as much surprise that when Mr. Kolding overtook the helm of CEO of Maersk Line in Jul 2006, had stepped down earlier this year. It is surprising that for person who was the CFO at such a large organisation, he was quoted to have said he has never met anyone who used derivatives. Maybe he doesn’t need health, home or car insurance. I know I certainly do.

In such a capital intensive industry, how does one forecast with any degree of certainty in an increasingly volatile market environment the extent of growth and return? How far out in revenue can the carriers actually fix and account for? 3 months? 6 months? They might have a lot of these ‘annual service contracts’ in place, but as we saw in 2009/2010, the contracts were not even worth the paper it was written on. Carriers reneged when the rates went up. And shippers also reneged when the rates plummeted in 2009. This may not have happened to everyone, but there were enough victims for the FMC (and also the European Competition Committee) to carry out an investigation.

Launched in 2010 following the introduction of a spot rate index – the Shanghai Containerised Freight Index (SCFI), risk management tools known as container derivatives or ‘container rate swap agreements’ were made available to the container shipping industry. It allows industry participants to actually fix a freight rate for a future period on both the inbound Transpacific and US East Coast routes ex-Asia in the financial market. Whilst the uptake has been slow, the interest and awareness has been growing. Derivatives have been perceived in a very negative light since the financial crisis. It was because the people who used them weren’t aware of the risks, let alone the product they were dealing with. Using container derivatives present a number of benefits and presents a new opportunity for BCOs, NVOCCs, carriers to change the way they do business and focus on service without forgoing profitability. Like a knife, it can either be a tool or a weapon – depending on how you use it.

So the recent round of rate increases by the TSA to bring rates back to 2011 levels not only defies the economies of demand and supply, but highlights the amount of cash that is bleeding in the industry. Will they manage to get a rate increase through? Prehaps, but will it stick? At the end of the day, when there is overcapacity in the market, the shippers and forwarders have the bargaining power. However, it is an irrational market and rates might even hold. (Even though I find this unlikely).

Turn it around though. Shippers have been great beneficiaries of the market share war and have been enjoying low rate levels in the past 12 months. If the carriers start to aggressively managed their capacity and idle their larger vessels, then they will be caught out just like what happened in 2010. Then the carriers can come up with another surcharge like NAS (Not Another Surcharge……..) and rates will increase significantly. How does one then explain to their CFO that freight rates have increased by 100%, 200% or even 300%?

The markets can stay irrational much longer than it can stay rational and there are now tools in the industry to help you manage freight rate risk.
2/15/2012 6:59:57 AM
 

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